In my capacity as President of the Marshall Center Armenian Alumni Association and the Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis Spectrum, I have the honor and pleasure to welcome you to our fifth seminar. In accordance with tradition, this seminar has been organized through the common efforts of our Association, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and Center for Strategic Analysis. It has received generous support from the US Embassy in Armenia.

The history of the Armenian Alumni Association is relatively short – our organization is only seven years old.  However, it unites the people, who work for the different ministries and other governmental bodies, for several universities and analytical centers. All share a common goal – to create a stable and secure Armenia, and stability and security throughout the South Caucasus region.  This is a difficult task, one that demands our combined intellectual strength and our efforts. It requires also mutual understanding and broad-based cooperation. In regard to these efforts, the contribution rendered by the Armenian Alumni Association is to a degree unique, for it counts among its members politicians and the military, decision-makers, professors, and other highly-skilled analysts—in other words, it brings together a great team of practitioners and thinkers able to contribute to the achievement of a stable and secure region.

I view our four previous seminars as open and constructive dialogues between the parties concerned.  To continue this tradition and to present our vision to the broader international community, we decided to alter our seminar to include those officials from embassies in Armenia from nations that participate in the Marshall Center programs.

Today’s seminar is the logical continuation of earlier discussions on critical developments in the South Caucasus and beyond.  We are planning to offer descriptions and analysis covering a certain time period, the period after the August war of 2008.

I would like to mention that the existed frameworks of the Marshall Center Armenian Alumni seminars introduce several important aspects:

- First, we discuss the most urgent problems that influence Armenia and the South Caucasus region.

Let me remind you that our first seminar in 2005 was dedicated to an examination of Armenia’s contribution to the struggle against terrorism; we then discussed, in the following year, the participation of our servicemen in the peace-keeping operations in Kosovo and Iraq. Our third seminar was dedicated to the role of Armenia in the European security system.

However, the developments in the region were characterized by growing tension on the bilateral and multilateral levels. Thus, our fourth seminar, which was held in October 2008, was dedicated to a discussion of the aftermath of the August war in Georgia and to an analysis of its impact upon the entire region.

- The second important aspect of our seminars is that our lively and open discussions allow us directly to present the Armenian official and un-official vision of regional problems not only to the faculty of one of the leading European centers, but also through them indirectly (or maybe directly), to deliver our message to the broad international community of professionals dealing with the security issues.

- Third, our seminars offer a great opportunity for the Marshall Center Alumni to meet in an open and friendly atmosphere, to remember the days spent in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, and to confirm our commitment to the ideals of the Marshall Center.

Dear friends,

It is quite difficult for me as a researcher and analyst to limit myself only to the introduction of the activity of our Association. Thus, before giving the floor over to our distinguished speakers, I would like to take the advantage of my privileged position to outline some parameters for our discussions.

The developments and trends in South Caucasus and beyond challenge the security of all of the states and state entities. These developments and trends continue significantly – I would say, strategically – to influence and change the security environment in our region. However, these changes can be mainly identified by, and are dependent upon the developments not only in the South Caucasus itself, but in the adjacent regions as well.

Today there is even more complicated situation in the region than before the Russian-Georgian war. It develops against the background of the world economic crisis, the parliamentary elections in Armenia and Georgia, and presidential elections in Russia, Turkey, and in the United States. Both factors – the crisis and the elections – influence internal developments in each state entity in the South Caucasus. However, I am sure that the presidential elections in the three key non-regional actor states will shape the contours of their foreign policy, or at least, cause a shifting of accents. This, in turn, will have an impact upon developments in our region.

I would like to distinguish some major indicators of the security environment as they relate to the broader Caspian-Caucasian region, beginning with a consideration of contextual factors relevant to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

For roughly twenty years it has been considered as a permanent “hot spot” balancing on the verge of overt conflict. Its resolution is complex as a consequence of

- The complicated bilateral relations of the parties involved, and their mutually exclusive interests,

- The intraregional relations, that is, the relationship between the regional states and the regional powers. Furthermore, this conflict is a very precise example of the way in which relationships between the external actors influence both directly and indirectly the process of conflict resolution.

However, there are the parity of military might between the parties to the conflict and the balance of forces in the region that preserve the current status quo in the area of the conflict.

At present, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is the only ethno-political conflict in the post-Soviet area where energy sources play a significant role. On the one side, they stimulate the growth of the Azerbaijani economy and therefore stimulate also an increase of the Azerbaijani military expenditures and provoke the growth of militaristic moods. On the other side, the pipelines constitute a restraining factor that decreases the possibility that Azerbaijan will unleash a war.

The second indicator is the following. The recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia does not mean the final resolution of the Abkhazian and the South Ossetian conflicts. Besides the tensions along the “Georgia-Abkhazia” and “Georgia-South Ossetia” axes, there is further growing tension in these semi-recognized state entities. The elections in South Ossetia and the internal processes in Abkhazia clearly indicate the complexity and fragility of the present situation there.

Third. The outcome of the August war of 2008 clearly indicated that Russia is ready to defend its strategic interests also by the utilization of hard security measures. Both Georgia and Russia continue to play in their bilateral relationship the so-called “Abkhazian” and “South Ossetian” cards, which is in light of their strategic viewpoints, understandable and logical.

However, Russian-Georgian bilateral relations affect less and less their relationships with the non-regional actors, mainly the U.S. and the European Union. The Russian-Georgian relationship is not a priority in Russia-U.S. and Russia-EU relationships.

Fourth. There is a growing involvement of Turkey in the South Caucasus through its relationship with Azerbaijan and Georgia. This engagement must be seen against the background of the increasing competition between Turkey and Russia. Any analysis of the trends and directions of Turkish foreign policy requires consideration of at least three factors. First, Turkey increasingly perceives itself as the second actor after Russia in terms of its role, involvement, and significance in Eurasia. Second, domestic political circumstances frequently shape and define the directions of Turkey’s foreign policy – or at least introduce serious corrections at the point of its implementation. Third, we are witnessing a move away, in Turkey’s foreign policy from the idea of “zero problems” with its neighbors.

As the fifth indicator I would mention the discussions and developments around Iran, which could affect – in the worst case scenario, the region and each of its state entities negatively.

*****

Dear colleagues,

I am sure that our distinguished speakers will concentrate upon some of these complex issues, and they will provide their valuable analysis and will provoke interesting and fruitful discussions among us.

I would like to thank Ambassador Hans-Johen Schmidt, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Republic of Armenia, and Ambassador John Heffern, the Ambassador of the United States of America to Republic of Armenia for their kind agreement to address the audience.

I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Arthur Bagdasaryan, the Secretary of the National Security Council of Armenia. Let me remind that our second seminar was hosted by the National Assembly, and Mr. Bagdasaryan addressed the participants in his capacity of President of the Parliament.

I am sure that our keynote speaker, Major General Dr. Hayk Kotanjian, the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies under the Ministry of Defense, will provide a multilevel and complex analysis of the current developments in the region in his presentation titled “Some asymmetric features of the security dynamics in the South Caucasus and the surrounding region.”

The theme of the security environment of Armenia and the role of international structures will be analyzed in the presentation of Mr. Samvel Mkrtchian, the Head of the Arms Control and International Security Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

The developments in the region are occurring against the background of the world economic crisis. Dr. Sabine Collmer will share with us her vision of the impact of the Euro-zone crisis upon European Union external relations. The EU is becoming a significant actor in the South Caucasus area, and of course each trend and shift in it economy affects the situation in our region.

The other representative of the Marshall Center, Dr. Gregory Gleason will discuss an important issue in his presentation, namely the role of energy resources.  The issue is critical to all of our immediate neighbors, whose economy is based upon either the importation of energy resources or its distribution.

Dear friends,

Let me once again welcome all the participants and wish interesting and provocative discussions. Thank you.

Tuesday, February 7, 2012, from 09:00 to 13:30

Venue: The Best Western Congress Hotel
Italy Street, 1

1. In your opinion, is there a collective security system in the South Caucasus? Could you please indicate the main security threats for Armenia within the context of the existing regional and global threats and challenges?

Unfortunately, the collective security system in the South Caucasus does not exist and cannot exist in the foreseeable future because of the completely different scale of the threats to all three regional states, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The level of interest of each nation toward each other is also dissimilar. Their perception of each other is very diverse – from “strategic partner” to “main enemy.”   Thus, their relationships are shaped on the basis of their political interests and on the exclusion of  “reluctant” neighbors. If Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are unable to create a unified economic system, they cannot establish a collective security system.

As concerns the main threats of Armenia’s security, they can be indentified mainly by reference to the established military and political balance in the region. The first involves the potential threat of a resumption of the overt stage of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The second concerns the existence of two closed borders that diminish the economic potential of Armenia and promote its artificial isolation. However, a distinction in this respect must be made clear: whereas the closure of the border with Azerbaijan can be viewed as the logical aftermath of the Karabakh war, the closure of the border with Turkey must be seen as resulting from a political decision taken in 1993 by the Turkish leadership. The latter contains a significant emotional component, and hence must be considered irrational.

There are serious problems with Georgia. Unfortunately, they still have not been resolved at the level of bilateral relationships. They are more visible in Samtskhe-Javakheti/ Javakh.  If we add to this list the intensive development of trilateral cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, then we can conclude that a combination  of strategic interests of Georgia with the strategic interests of Armenia will be difficult to establish. Owing of the absence of a neighborly relationships with Turkey and the continuing “neither war, nor peace” stage in all relations with Azerbaijan, any instability in Georgia may well become ramified in a manner that threatens Armenia’s security.

The increasing presence of Russia in the region is also controversial. For Armenia the preservation and strengthening of the current level of the relationship with Russia is vital. In the meantime, it is necessary to intensify broader cooperation with the European Union and the U.S. – not  least because any escalation of the conflict between Russia and Georgia will bring an indirect security threat for our nation.

In the South, any escalation of the situation around Iran and inside Iran will impact Armenia only negatively.

On the global level I would mention, as a main security threat to Armenia, any new wave of the global economic crisis. As occurred with the first crisis, any such new development will inevitably influence the Armenian economy. Out-migration constitutes one of indicators of economic developments. In case of countries like Armenia, that is, nations with limited resources and limited opportunities to be integrated into the world economic space, migration has already become a serious factor that influences national security.

2. You have mentioned the situation around Iran. In your opinion, how can its transformation into the military phase influence Armenia? What could Yerevan do to secure our country, even if only partly, against the aftermaths of military intervention in Islamic Republic?

I am not a specialist on Iranian affairs, or a specialist in military planning, therefore I cannot allow to myself to speculate on this theme. However, it is obvious, that for Armenia a war will lead at a minimum to a temporary closure of another border, and the termination of all existing economic projects with Iran and the transportation of Iranian goods through the Armenian territory. Furthermore, it will provoke a flow of Iranian refugees to Armenia (as well as to Azerbaijan). We can hardly expect that the immigrants will be the representatives of the well provided strata of the Iranian population. Thus, Armenia be placed under a heavy burden to provide shelter, food, medication, etc. for these people. Yerevan is highly interested in prevention an escalation of conflict. However, I don’t see any mechanisms in place that will protect Armenia against the negative impact of all this –  incomplete –  list of potential problems.

3. Is the situation in Syria a part of the common global process? In your opinion, could they have an impact upon developments in the South Caucasus in any way?

Of course, it is a part of the “global process,” if you have in mind those changes that began in February of 2011, in the Arab world. Exactly one year ago the developed countries enthusiastically welcomed the first “swallows” of the Arab spring. This awakening then became transformed into civil wars in Libya and Syria; it brought to power moderate Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt. The vigorous discussions on the rapid democratization of the Arab world have almost disappeared from the Western media. Many politicians seem to be attempting to avoid a public discussions around this theme. However, the West as a whole understands quite well that, if an avalanche is to be avoided,  which will include radical Islamization of the Arab states and uncontrolled migration, significant economic assistance will be necessary. It appears quite possible, against this background, that economic assistance to those countries that are more stable and secure  will be reduced: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia..

The processes in Syria, as well as a situation around Iran increase instability in the region directly adjacent to the South Caucasus. In its status as a regional power, Turkey is more and more becoming involved into the conflicts with its immediate neighbors. It does so against the background of its own growing domestic tensions. And this is another dangerous trend for Armenia.

4. Is it possible to predict further developments in Armenian-Turkish relationships, taking into consideration the existed historical, political, and military realities in our region?  

In addition to the objectively existed processes in the region, I would pay attention to the different level of interest of Armenia and Turkey in establishing and improving bilateral relations. The absolute foreign policy priority for Turkey has already become developments in the Middle East. All the problems related to Armenia have been relegated to a second-level of importance. It is not be excluded that further developments in this bilateral relationships will depend upon the results of the parliamentary elections in Armenia and the presidential elections in Turkey. However I would not expect the serious shifts in the Armenian dimension of the Turkish policy even if strong pressure were to be placed upon Turkey by, first of all, the U.S. and France.

5. Does the Armenian leadership adequately consider the long- term geopolitical perspectives in reference to the new realities that characterize  the security environment of the XXI century? How confidently does Armenia fit  into this environment?   

I believe it does. There are three main goals. First, to preserve the existing military-political balance in the region and to prevent political drift toward one of the non-regional actors, whether Russia, the U.S., or the EU. Second, to prevent the resumption of the military stage of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Third, to secure the country against a deep economic crisis. These goals can be considered as belonging to the mid-term perspective; however,  one cannot speak about the long-term perspectives without considering these issues.  Armenia is trying to fit into the changing security environment in the broader region. To some extend our country has attained the goal of becoming a significant actor in the political processes in the South Caucasus region. It is our major achievement up to the present.

6. What could be the results of the on-going arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan if we take into consideration that both parties, to varying degrees, sacrifice in this process social and economic developments and strengthening of each society?

The arms race cannot lead to anything good, especially if viewed from the perspective of the social and economic development each state is engaged in. Today Azerbaijan possesses more economic possibilities owing to its capacity to produce and transport energy sources. In the meantime, the huge expenditures for armaments, in parallel with insignificant improvement of life conditions for the majority of the population and against the background of the expanding Islamist moods in the society, create fertile ground for increasing public dissatisfaction. In Armenia an awareness that the arms race is imposes by Azerbaijan is widespread. Thus, it is understood as necessary to strengthen the army and the nation’s defense capabilities.

7. Armenia’s security environment includes not only external, but also internal processes. The latter,  unlike external processes, can be controlled domestically. In your opinion, do the Armenian authorities control internal security?

The forthcoming parliamentary elections will answer your question. I would mention as a main component of the internal security the ability of both the government and the opposition to be engaged in a civilized political dialogue, one aimed at the achievement of real results, rather than to be “a dialogue for the sake of a dialogue.”  In the end, the level of the internal security and stability defines in many respects the level of the external security.

On February 7, 2012, the Marshall Center Armenian Alumni Association in cooperation with the Center for Strategic Analysis SPECTRUM, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and with the support of the U.S. Embassy in Armenia holds its fifth seminar “New Challenges to the Regional Security.”  The participants discuss the dynamics of the security environment in the South Caucasus, the role of the external actors, the influence of the developments in the Broader Middle East, as well as the impact of the energy sources and the world economic crisis upon the developments in the region.
Among the participants were the MC Alumni, who represent the MoD, MFA, the Parliament, MES, Police. The Ambassadors and officials from embassies in Armenia from nations that participate in the Marshall Center programs also attended the seminar.

The Program of the Seminar

The Opening Address of Dr. Gayane Novikova

Information about the seminar in the media:

БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ – ДЕЛО ОБЩЕЕ (Гаянэ Мовсесян)

Посол: США стремятся создать для Армении политические и экономические альтернативы

ԱԱԽ քարտուղար Արթուր Բաղդասարյանն այսօր մասնակցել է Ջ. Մարշալի անվան կենտրոնի շրջանավարտների Հայկական Ասոցիացիայի, Եվրոպական անվտանգության ուսումնասիրման կենտրոնի և ՀՀ-ում ԱՄՆ դեսպանատան կողմից համատեղ կազմակերպված “Հարավային Կովկաս` նոր մարտահրավերներ” թեմայով սեմինարին:

Гайк Котанджян: Залог демократического разрешения конфликтов – взаимное признание сторон

Секретарь Совбеза: Железная дорога Баку-Тбилиси-Карс – одно из проявлений антиармянской политики Турции и Азербайджана

США пытаются создать для Армении альтернативу через Турцию – посол США

However, the visit this month of Nicolas Sarkozy in the South Caucasus has caused great excitement in all three capitals. The first visit of the President of France to the region was in August, 2008; it aimed to find an appropriate framework for a resolution of the overt confrontation between Russia and Georgia. It resulted in the “Medvedev – Sarkozy Plan.”

The enthusiasm and involvement of France in the developments in North Africa and the Middle East have given the impression that France is seeking to play a leading role in the formation of a common European foreign policy.  The recent visit of President Sarkozy in the South Caucasus should be considered through this prism. Moreover, it can be evaluated also as an effort to take the initiative in this region away from Russia, or at least as an attempt, using the region’s developments, to confirm that France provides an independent “French” politics not always consistent with the EU and NATO approaches.

The calls for resolution of all existing inter-state problems in the region, against the backdrop of the positive example of the German-French relationship, should stress the necessity to resolve the tensions between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, and between Russia and Georgia. However, the situation of unresolved conflicts against the background of Russian-Georgian relations and the ineffectiveness of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidential summits, has opened a window of opportunity for France in the South Caucasus.

*****

In Armenia, President Sarkozy confirmed once again the French position in regard to the Armenian Genocide and the impossibility of Turkey’s membership in the European Union. He stressed that France was and is still a friend of Armenia, and expressed his support for the foreign policy conducted by the Armenian leadership. In regard to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the French President clearly stated that it cannot be resolved by force. It is very symptomatic that Sarkozy did not meet with representatives of the Armenian opposition and did not touch upon the issue of Armenian internal developments in his public speeches and statements.

There was a short tête-à-tête meeting of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and France in Azerbaijan. During a ceremony laying the cornerstone for a French lycée in Baku, Nikolas Sarkozy called for the implementation of Francophone values of tolerance, freedom, human rights and democracy. The Azerbaijani side expressed its disappointment at the French position on the resolution of Armenian-Turkish tensions. The short duration of the visit itself – about three hours – was discouraging to the Azerbaijani leadership and provoked speculation in the Mass media and among the analysts.

Finally, during the Georgian part of the trip the significance of Georgia for the European Union was stressed. Sarkozy confirmed the EU approach to the resolution of the “Georgian” conflicts. However, the French President voiced the unwillingness of his country to confront Russia and appealed to his Georgian counterpart to review his approach toward Russia, mentioning that “Russia should again become the partner and friend of Georgia.” In the meantime he cautiously supported the desire of Georgia to be integrated into the EU (“in future”), but not into NATO.

It is worth mentioning that the relationships of France with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were built on a parity basis until this October visit to the region. A comparative analysis of the statements in all three capitals as available in the Mass media indicates that the importance of Armenia slightly shifted: It became the focus of attention.

However, there is another interesting nuance to Sarkozy’s tour in the South Caucasus. The duration of his stay in Armenia, his several anti-Turkish statements, his generous gift –  a statue by Auguste Rodin; a neutral tone of his statements and the omission of discussions on energy supplies in Azerbaijan, as well as his calm confirmation of Georgia’s territorial integrity and the lack of criticism of Russia, – this all leads  to the conclusion: France shapes its own foreign policy and it does not necessarily reflect the interests of all EU member states. France is demonstrating to its partners in the Euro-Atlantic coalition its ability to take political decisions and to achieve certain results (as occurred in the case of NATO operations in Libya). From this viewpoint, the South Caucasus is “fertile soil,” for several reasons:

- A preservation of relative stability in the region directly bordering Turkey, Iran, and Russia is in the interest of all non-regional actors, directly or indirectly involved in developments in the South Caucasus;

- France is considered by all regional states as a friendly European country; and the European direction is viewed by the South Caucasus states mainly as allowing them to balance, to a certain degree, the U.S. and Russia;

- Russia, which still has enough serious tools to influence its regional partners and counter-partners, favors such activity by France, especially if the latter openly demonstrates its sympathy to Russia;

- Turkey finds itself now engaged in crucial internal and external problems; the South Caucasus is not a key region for its geopolitical activity.

Summing up, it is possible to argue that France is shaping its policy according to its own scale of priorities in regard to each state in the South Caucasus. The question whether the “Caucasian nuances” of French politics that came out during the visit of President Sarkozy will become the pan-European approach is still an open query.