March 21, 2012

1) The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia said recently that the return of part of the territories of Karabakh to Azerbaijan is included in the negotiation package of the OSCE Minsk Group. This is nothing new because the Madrid Principles were published earlier. However, quite recently the representatives of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia mentioned that Armenia has nothing to return to Azerbaijan, and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic has to make any decision about the return of the territories. In your opinion, could the very fact that the society does not know the details of the negotiations torpedo the conflict resolution? Is Armenian society ready to return a part of the Karabakh territories?

Let us clarify the formulation of the question from the very beginning. I prefer to use the expression “transfer of the territories” instead of “return of the territories.” In any discussion in regard to the territories it is necessary to take into account the completely opposite approaches of the parties to the conflict: on the one side Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, and on the other side – Azerbaijan. The difference is very visible in the terms in use: the Armenian sides refer to the territories as “liberated,” while the Azerbaijani side refers as to them as “occupied.” Nevertheless, both terms indicate the priority of the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict for the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies.  In this context they have the same meaningfulness.

Thus, the transfer of a section of the territories adjacent to the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Republic is a strategic issue for at least four state entities: Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Azerbaijan, and Iran. This issue is more serious for the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) and Armenia because, above all, the defense line of the NKR runs throughout these territories. Their transfer would lead to a weakening of the Armenian defense line, to the emergence of a variety of economic and communication problems, to changes in the demographic situation in the territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, and to possible demographic shifts in Karabakh itself. A subjective factor is also of great significance: namely, the pride of the Armenian side owing to its military victory in the Karabakh war. As a consequence of all these factors, in the strategy of the two Armenian state entities – the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia and un-recognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic – the preservation of the status quo is considered as a high priority.

The issue of the transfer of the section of the territories around Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan is for the most part outside the framework of the on-going discussion in the Armenian society. First, these territories are considered as historical Armenian land; second, as mentioned, they maintain strategic importance; and third, it is necessary to pay attention to the Constitution of the NKR, where it is stated: “Until the restoration of the state territorial integrity of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and the adjustment of its borders, public authority is exercised on the territory under factual jurisdiction of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.”

As a whole, this means that the two Armenian societies are not prepared to transfer the mentioned territories to Azerbaijan. One could find here some parallels with developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the Israeli side rejects any transfer of territories to the Palestinian control before the signing of a peace agreement and recognition of the State of Israel by the Palestinian side. In the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, I believe, there cannot be any transfer of any part of the territories controlled by the NKR, to Azerbaijan (please recall that Azerbaijan is occupying now the Shahumian region that belonged to the  Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Republic in the Soviet period and the Armenian enclave Artzvashen which was under the jurisdiction of the Armenian SSR)  before a peace agreement is reached and before it is signed not only by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also by the NKR president.

In the current situation around the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict there is a lack of guarantees that the reached agreements (if any) would be or could be implemented completely. The terminology and the provisions of the future treaty must be very clear and unambiguous; they must eliminate any possibility for a double-reading of any provision of the document (documents). The Turkish-Armenian Protocols constitute a recent example of the ‘dual’ reading’ of the same set of terms.

In addition, a clear analysis of the level of gains and losses by the Armenian sides in the case of a transfer of a part of the territories controlled by Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan is absent (or at least it is unknown to broader strata of Armenian society).

I do not think that immediately after completion of a comprehensive agreement, which will possibly include a provision for the transfer of some territories to Azerbaijan, the latter would then open the border with Armenia and “ask” Turkey to do the same. An inclusion of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh into all existing and future energy and communication projects as well as a securing of the political and human level of relationships between two peoples and the three state entities is also unlikely.

As a whole, the lack of widespread awareness in all three societies about the details of the negotiations allows on the one hand preservation of a certain degree of maneuverability in the negotiation process per se and on the other hand, however, it increases the tension in those societies at present unprepared to accept compromises.  Furthermore, the exclusion of representatives of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic from the negotiations not only slows down the conflict resolution process, but also misrepresents the very essence of the conflict.

As for the question whether unawareness of negotiations details could torpedo the resolution of the conflict or not, my answer would be “no.” It is impossible to torpedo something that does not exist. The conflict remains unresolved, not a single document has been signed, mistrust between the parties to the conflict is growing, and the militarist rhetoric of the highest Azerbaijani leadership is becoming tougher daily. For Azerbaijan, to keep the society informed on the negotiations through sporadic “emission” of merely technical information, such as who met where with whom, and also only through partial disclosure of the substance of negotiations, is a tool to mobilize mass activity in support of the state position in the negotiations.  Of course, direct threats articulated by the Azerbaijani side and addressed to Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia do not promote a searching for a compromise acceptable to all parties to the conflict. The latter cannot even agree upon the basic principles. Thus, the conflict will remain at this stage for quite a long time. However, I do not exclude the resumption of full-scale military action in the conflict area.

 2) High-ranking Armenian officials try to convince the society that they are making efforts to achieve an international recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.  Does this mean, in your opinion, that Armenia is seeking to persuade some other nations to recognize the NKR prior to its public recognition by Armenia? What country (or countries) in this case should recognize Nagorno Karabakh first?

The discussions on recognition or non-recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic can be meaningful if they evaluate adequately the consequences of recognition for the NKR. I don’t consider as an issue of great importance what country might be the first to recognition the independence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Essential is that de jure recognition should be accompanied by the intention of at least a part of the international community to take Karabakh out of Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction and to consider it as a full-fledged,  self-established state. In this case Nagorno Karabakh has every opportunity to preserve itself as an independent state.

A recent example of border revision is the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. However, the high interest of the leading European countries and the U.S. in the preservation of peace on the European continent was a guarantee per se that prevented escalation of the conflict into a new, overt, stage.  There is no such imperative commitment in the Nagorno Karabakh case.

Another example is the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, Venezuela, and two island states. In the mid-term perspective, the future for South Ossetia involves integration into Russia. The prospect for Abkhazia is as a protracted Russian protectorate that will perpetually attempt to balance itself between Russia, Turkey, and Georgia.

A very interesting case is the forthcoming referendum on independence in Scotland.

I believe that time works in favor of Nagorno Karabakh. Accelerated and unilateral recognition, first of all, will narrow the possibilities of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh on the political level; secondly, it will make all the negotiation formats and proposals senseless; and, thirdly, it will sharply increase an already very high level of tension in the region.

For Nagorno Karabakh itself, the recognition only by Armenia would lead to a deadlocked situation; in the best case, this scenario could be followed by integration of this state entity into Armenia. In turn, this development will lead to a questioning of its legitimacy whenever it is viewed in terms of international law (however, it is possible to appeal to the ‘divided nation’ precedent).

I think that the Armenian diplomacy and efforts of the policy-makers should prepare – and perhaps even push gradually – the international community to acknowledge that:

- Nagorno Karabakh can serve as a strategic obstacle against any intensification of Islamist moods and activities of the Islamist organizations in the area of the Broader South Caucasus;

- As a de facto state with its specific democracy-building experience, NKR cannot be placed under the jurisdiction of an authoritarian state: Azerbaijan;

- Any resumption of military action – against the background of threatening regional developments and an arms race, into which Azerbaijan is drawing the entire region, will lead to economic and humanitarian catastrophe; it will affect not only direct parties to the conflict, but also the neighboring countries.

It is possible to involve the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the international development projects without any preconditions in regard to de jure recognition of its independence, and to do so with simultaneous stimulation of the peace process within the OSCE Minsk Group format.

3) EU representatives have already openly indicated the willingness of their organization to play a more active role in resolving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  The EU Parliament document assumes the implementation of a peacekeeping mission in Karabakh (Resolution 2216/ 2010). Moreover, the EU wishes direct, without Azerbaijan’s permission, access to the Karabakh territory..  How would you evaluate the perspectives of an increasing EU role in the resolution of the conflict? Could Armenia admit the EU peacekeepers into the conflict area?

The EU intention in regard to direct contacts with the NKR authorities and a direct entry in Karabakh was articulated several years ago. However, Peter Semnebi, who was the EU Special Representative in the South Caucasus, whose mandate includes also a stipulation “to contribute to conflict resolution,” has not visited Nagorno Karabakh.  It is not a question of whether Armenia or Azerbaijan should allow direct entry to the territory of Nagorno Karabakh, or not, but whether Brussels can ignore opinions in Yerevan (which does not conceal its interest in visitation by EU and other international organizations representatives NKR) or Baku, and whether Brussels can send its representative to Stepanakert.

Resolution 2216, adopted by the European Parliament in May, 2010, to which you refer, is quite contradictory.  The EU role in conflict resolution is stated in the paragraph related to all conflicts in the South Caucasus:  “The EU has an important role to play in contributing to the culture of dialogue in the region and in ensuring the implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.” Within the context of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution, with a few small exceptions, the 2216 Resolution, actually operates with the terminology that was in use near the initial stage of the negotiations.  It ignores the provisions of the Madrid Principles, and all the previous statements of the EU itself in regard to this issue. In particular, it refers to the status quo as “created by force and with no international legitimacy.” Furthermore, it completely neglects the fate of the Armenian population forced to flee Baku, Ganja (Kirovabad) and other cities and towns of their compacted living environment. Finally, it repeatedly appeals to an imprecise intermediate status for Nagorno Karabakh.

Of course, shifts in the conflict resolution process would be welcomed, including those that could involve active participation of the European Union. However, the EU is currently mired in its own economic and political troubles, and we should not forget that any peacekeeping mission is a very costly arrangement. In addition, the peacekeepers can enter into the conflict area only after a peace treaty has been signed.  Since there is not even a signed framework agreement, to say nothing regarding a comprehensive peace treaty, all discussions about the peacekeeping operation, the institutional affiliation, or the ethnicity of the peacekeepers remains at a purely speculative level.

4) Armenia has been moving away from the policy of complementarity, rejecting economic integration with Russia in favor of future economic integration with the EU. The Armenian Prime-Minister has stated that Armenia cannot be a member of the Custom Union because it does not possess a common border with its member states. However, he did not explain why the same lack of a common border is not an obstacle to establishment of Free Trade Zones with the EU and CIS countries.  What did the Prime Minister understate?  

I do not agree that Armenia has been moving away from the policy of complementarity. Just the opposite: it is trying to return to this policy. The decision not to participate in the Custom Union with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus fully fits with the desire to correct and balance, above all, the political priorities of Armenia. The level of bilateral relations between Armenia and these three states, all members of the Custom Union, is very high, especially with Russia. And, finally, all of them sign agreements on free trade areas in the CIS.

Intensification of cooperation with the EU will enable Armenia to enlarge its political and economic opportunities and contribute to the further democratization of the country. It can play also a role in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

In my capacity as President of the Marshall Center Armenian Alumni Association and the Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis Spectrum, I have the honor and pleasure to welcome you to our fifth seminar. In accordance with tradition, this seminar has been organized through the common efforts of our Association, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and Center for Strategic Analysis. It has received generous support from the US Embassy in Armenia.

The history of the Armenian Alumni Association is relatively short – our organization is only seven years old.  However, it unites the people, who work for the different ministries and other governmental bodies, for several universities and analytical centers. All share a common goal – to create a stable and secure Armenia, and stability and security throughout the South Caucasus region.  This is a difficult task, one that demands our combined intellectual strength and our efforts. It requires also mutual understanding and broad-based cooperation. In regard to these efforts, the contribution rendered by the Armenian Alumni Association is to a degree unique, for it counts among its members politicians and the military, decision-makers, professors, and other highly-skilled analysts—in other words, it brings together a great team of practitioners and thinkers able to contribute to the achievement of a stable and secure region.

I view our four previous seminars as open and constructive dialogues between the parties concerned.  To continue this tradition and to present our vision to the broader international community, we decided to alter our seminar to include those officials from embassies in Armenia from nations that participate in the Marshall Center programs.

Today’s seminar is the logical continuation of earlier discussions on critical developments in the South Caucasus and beyond.  We are planning to offer descriptions and analysis covering a certain time period, the period after the August war of 2008.

I would like to mention that the existed frameworks of the Marshall Center Armenian Alumni seminars introduce several important aspects:

- First, we discuss the most urgent problems that influence Armenia and the South Caucasus region.

Let me remind you that our first seminar in 2005 was dedicated to an examination of Armenia’s contribution to the struggle against terrorism; we then discussed, in the following year, the participation of our servicemen in the peace-keeping operations in Kosovo and Iraq. Our third seminar was dedicated to the role of Armenia in the European security system.

However, the developments in the region were characterized by growing tension on the bilateral and multilateral levels. Thus, our fourth seminar, which was held in October 2008, was dedicated to a discussion of the aftermath of the August war in Georgia and to an analysis of its impact upon the entire region.

- The second important aspect of our seminars is that our lively and open discussions allow us directly to present the Armenian official and un-official vision of regional problems not only to the faculty of one of the leading European centers, but also through them indirectly (or maybe directly), to deliver our message to the broad international community of professionals dealing with the security issues.

- Third, our seminars offer a great opportunity for the Marshall Center Alumni to meet in an open and friendly atmosphere, to remember the days spent in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, and to confirm our commitment to the ideals of the Marshall Center.

Dear friends,

It is quite difficult for me as a researcher and analyst to limit myself only to the introduction of the activity of our Association. Thus, before giving the floor over to our distinguished speakers, I would like to take the advantage of my privileged position to outline some parameters for our discussions.

The developments and trends in South Caucasus and beyond challenge the security of all of the states and state entities. These developments and trends continue significantly – I would say, strategically – to influence and change the security environment in our region. However, these changes can be mainly identified by, and are dependent upon the developments not only in the South Caucasus itself, but in the adjacent regions as well.

Today there is even more complicated situation in the region than before the Russian-Georgian war. It develops against the background of the world economic crisis, the parliamentary elections in Armenia and Georgia, and presidential elections in Russia, Turkey, and in the United States. Both factors – the crisis and the elections – influence internal developments in each state entity in the South Caucasus. However, I am sure that the presidential elections in the three key non-regional actor states will shape the contours of their foreign policy, or at least, cause a shifting of accents. This, in turn, will have an impact upon developments in our region.

I would like to distinguish some major indicators of the security environment as they relate to the broader Caspian-Caucasian region, beginning with a consideration of contextual factors relevant to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

For roughly twenty years it has been considered as a permanent “hot spot” balancing on the verge of overt conflict. Its resolution is complex as a consequence of

- The complicated bilateral relations of the parties involved, and their mutually exclusive interests,

- The intraregional relations, that is, the relationship between the regional states and the regional powers. Furthermore, this conflict is a very precise example of the way in which relationships between the external actors influence both directly and indirectly the process of conflict resolution.

However, there are the parity of military might between the parties to the conflict and the balance of forces in the region that preserve the current status quo in the area of the conflict.

At present, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is the only ethno-political conflict in the post-Soviet area where energy sources play a significant role. On the one side, they stimulate the growth of the Azerbaijani economy and therefore stimulate also an increase of the Azerbaijani military expenditures and provoke the growth of militaristic moods. On the other side, the pipelines constitute a restraining factor that decreases the possibility that Azerbaijan will unleash a war.

The second indicator is the following. The recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia does not mean the final resolution of the Abkhazian and the South Ossetian conflicts. Besides the tensions along the “Georgia-Abkhazia” and “Georgia-South Ossetia” axes, there is further growing tension in these semi-recognized state entities. The elections in South Ossetia and the internal processes in Abkhazia clearly indicate the complexity and fragility of the present situation there.

Third. The outcome of the August war of 2008 clearly indicated that Russia is ready to defend its strategic interests also by the utilization of hard security measures. Both Georgia and Russia continue to play in their bilateral relationship the so-called “Abkhazian” and “South Ossetian” cards, which is in light of their strategic viewpoints, understandable and logical.

However, Russian-Georgian bilateral relations affect less and less their relationships with the non-regional actors, mainly the U.S. and the European Union. The Russian-Georgian relationship is not a priority in Russia-U.S. and Russia-EU relationships.

Fourth. There is a growing involvement of Turkey in the South Caucasus through its relationship with Azerbaijan and Georgia. This engagement must be seen against the background of the increasing competition between Turkey and Russia. Any analysis of the trends and directions of Turkish foreign policy requires consideration of at least three factors. First, Turkey increasingly perceives itself as the second actor after Russia in terms of its role, involvement, and significance in Eurasia. Second, domestic political circumstances frequently shape and define the directions of Turkey’s foreign policy – or at least introduce serious corrections at the point of its implementation. Third, we are witnessing a move away, in Turkey’s foreign policy from the idea of “zero problems” with its neighbors.

As the fifth indicator I would mention the discussions and developments around Iran, which could affect – in the worst case scenario, the region and each of its state entities negatively.

*****

Dear colleagues,

I am sure that our distinguished speakers will concentrate upon some of these complex issues, and they will provide their valuable analysis and will provoke interesting and fruitful discussions among us.

I would like to thank Ambassador Hans-Johen Schmidt, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Republic of Armenia, and Ambassador John Heffern, the Ambassador of the United States of America to Republic of Armenia for their kind agreement to address the audience.

I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Arthur Bagdasaryan, the Secretary of the National Security Council of Armenia. Let me remind that our second seminar was hosted by the National Assembly, and Mr. Bagdasaryan addressed the participants in his capacity of President of the Parliament.

I am sure that our keynote speaker, Major General Dr. Hayk Kotanjian, the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies under the Ministry of Defense, will provide a multilevel and complex analysis of the current developments in the region in his presentation titled “Some asymmetric features of the security dynamics in the South Caucasus and the surrounding region.”

The theme of the security environment of Armenia and the role of international structures will be analyzed in the presentation of Mr. Samvel Mkrtchian, the Head of the Arms Control and International Security Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

The developments in the region are occurring against the background of the world economic crisis. Dr. Sabine Collmer will share with us her vision of the impact of the Euro-zone crisis upon European Union external relations. The EU is becoming a significant actor in the South Caucasus area, and of course each trend and shift in it economy affects the situation in our region.

The other representative of the Marshall Center, Dr. Gregory Gleason will discuss an important issue in his presentation, namely the role of energy resources.  The issue is critical to all of our immediate neighbors, whose economy is based upon either the importation of energy resources or its distribution.

Dear friends,

Let me once again welcome all the participants and wish interesting and provocative discussions. Thank you.

Tuesday, February 7, 2012, from 09:00 to 13:30

Venue: The Best Western Congress Hotel
Italy Street, 1

1. In your opinion, is there a collective security system in the South Caucasus? Could you please indicate the main security threats for Armenia within the context of the existing regional and global threats and challenges?

Unfortunately, the collective security system in the South Caucasus does not exist and cannot exist in the foreseeable future because of the completely different scale of the threats to all three regional states, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The level of interest of each nation toward each other is also dissimilar. Their perception of each other is very diverse – from “strategic partner” to “main enemy.”   Thus, their relationships are shaped on the basis of their political interests and on the exclusion of  “reluctant” neighbors. If Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are unable to create a unified economic system, they cannot establish a collective security system.

As concerns the main threats of Armenia’s security, they can be indentified mainly by reference to the established military and political balance in the region. The first involves the potential threat of a resumption of the overt stage of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The second concerns the existence of two closed borders that diminish the economic potential of Armenia and promote its artificial isolation. However, a distinction in this respect must be made clear: whereas the closure of the border with Azerbaijan can be viewed as the logical aftermath of the Karabakh war, the closure of the border with Turkey must be seen as resulting from a political decision taken in 1993 by the Turkish leadership. The latter contains a significant emotional component, and hence must be considered irrational.

There are serious problems with Georgia. Unfortunately, they still have not been resolved at the level of bilateral relationships. They are more visible in Samtskhe-Javakheti/ Javakh.  If we add to this list the intensive development of trilateral cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, then we can conclude that a combination  of strategic interests of Georgia with the strategic interests of Armenia will be difficult to establish. Owing of the absence of a neighborly relationships with Turkey and the continuing “neither war, nor peace” stage in all relations with Azerbaijan, any instability in Georgia may well become ramified in a manner that threatens Armenia’s security.

The increasing presence of Russia in the region is also controversial. For Armenia the preservation and strengthening of the current level of the relationship with Russia is vital. In the meantime, it is necessary to intensify broader cooperation with the European Union and the U.S. – not  least because any escalation of the conflict between Russia and Georgia will bring an indirect security threat for our nation.

In the South, any escalation of the situation around Iran and inside Iran will impact Armenia only negatively.

On the global level I would mention, as a main security threat to Armenia, any new wave of the global economic crisis. As occurred with the first crisis, any such new development will inevitably influence the Armenian economy. Out-migration constitutes one of indicators of economic developments. In case of countries like Armenia, that is, nations with limited resources and limited opportunities to be integrated into the world economic space, migration has already become a serious factor that influences national security.

2. You have mentioned the situation around Iran. In your opinion, how can its transformation into the military phase influence Armenia? What could Yerevan do to secure our country, even if only partly, against the aftermaths of military intervention in Islamic Republic?

I am not a specialist on Iranian affairs, or a specialist in military planning, therefore I cannot allow to myself to speculate on this theme. However, it is obvious, that for Armenia a war will lead at a minimum to a temporary closure of another border, and the termination of all existing economic projects with Iran and the transportation of Iranian goods through the Armenian territory. Furthermore, it will provoke a flow of Iranian refugees to Armenia (as well as to Azerbaijan). We can hardly expect that the immigrants will be the representatives of the well provided strata of the Iranian population. Thus, Armenia be placed under a heavy burden to provide shelter, food, medication, etc. for these people. Yerevan is highly interested in prevention an escalation of conflict. However, I don’t see any mechanisms in place that will protect Armenia against the negative impact of all this –  incomplete –  list of potential problems.

3. Is the situation in Syria a part of the common global process? In your opinion, could they have an impact upon developments in the South Caucasus in any way?

Of course, it is a part of the “global process,” if you have in mind those changes that began in February of 2011, in the Arab world. Exactly one year ago the developed countries enthusiastically welcomed the first “swallows” of the Arab spring. This awakening then became transformed into civil wars in Libya and Syria; it brought to power moderate Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt. The vigorous discussions on the rapid democratization of the Arab world have almost disappeared from the Western media. Many politicians seem to be attempting to avoid a public discussions around this theme. However, the West as a whole understands quite well that, if an avalanche is to be avoided,  which will include radical Islamization of the Arab states and uncontrolled migration, significant economic assistance will be necessary. It appears quite possible, against this background, that economic assistance to those countries that are more stable and secure  will be reduced: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia..

The processes in Syria, as well as a situation around Iran increase instability in the region directly adjacent to the South Caucasus. In its status as a regional power, Turkey is more and more becoming involved into the conflicts with its immediate neighbors. It does so against the background of its own growing domestic tensions. And this is another dangerous trend for Armenia.

4. Is it possible to predict further developments in Armenian-Turkish relationships, taking into consideration the existed historical, political, and military realities in our region?  

In addition to the objectively existed processes in the region, I would pay attention to the different level of interest of Armenia and Turkey in establishing and improving bilateral relations. The absolute foreign policy priority for Turkey has already become developments in the Middle East. All the problems related to Armenia have been relegated to a second-level of importance. It is not be excluded that further developments in this bilateral relationships will depend upon the results of the parliamentary elections in Armenia and the presidential elections in Turkey. However I would not expect the serious shifts in the Armenian dimension of the Turkish policy even if strong pressure were to be placed upon Turkey by, first of all, the U.S. and France.

5. Does the Armenian leadership adequately consider the long- term geopolitical perspectives in reference to the new realities that characterize  the security environment of the XXI century? How confidently does Armenia fit  into this environment?   

I believe it does. There are three main goals. First, to preserve the existing military-political balance in the region and to prevent political drift toward one of the non-regional actors, whether Russia, the U.S., or the EU. Second, to prevent the resumption of the military stage of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Third, to secure the country against a deep economic crisis. These goals can be considered as belonging to the mid-term perspective; however,  one cannot speak about the long-term perspectives without considering these issues.  Armenia is trying to fit into the changing security environment in the broader region. To some extend our country has attained the goal of becoming a significant actor in the political processes in the South Caucasus region. It is our major achievement up to the present.

6. What could be the results of the on-going arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan if we take into consideration that both parties, to varying degrees, sacrifice in this process social and economic developments and strengthening of each society?

The arms race cannot lead to anything good, especially if viewed from the perspective of the social and economic development each state is engaged in. Today Azerbaijan possesses more economic possibilities owing to its capacity to produce and transport energy sources. In the meantime, the huge expenditures for armaments, in parallel with insignificant improvement of life conditions for the majority of the population and against the background of the expanding Islamist moods in the society, create fertile ground for increasing public dissatisfaction. In Armenia an awareness that the arms race is imposes by Azerbaijan is widespread. Thus, it is understood as necessary to strengthen the army and the nation’s defense capabilities.

7. Armenia’s security environment includes not only external, but also internal processes. The latter,  unlike external processes, can be controlled domestically. In your opinion, do the Armenian authorities control internal security?

The forthcoming parliamentary elections will answer your question. I would mention as a main component of the internal security the ability of both the government and the opposition to be engaged in a civilized political dialogue, one aimed at the achievement of real results, rather than to be “a dialogue for the sake of a dialogue.”  In the end, the level of the internal security and stability defines in many respects the level of the external security.